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Book Note
THE REGULATORY AFTERMATH OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL
CRISIS, by Eilís Ferran, Niamh Moloney, Jennifer G. Hill, and
John C. Coffee, Jr. 1
REUBEN ZARAMIAN
THE TURMOIL THAT ERUPTED after global markets crashed in 20082 opened the way

for a rush of regulatory reforms at nearly every level of government and industry.
In The Regulatory Aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, Ferran et al detail these
worldwide developments, focusing particularly on changes in the European Union,
Australia, and the United States.
Ethiopis Tafara opens the monograph3 with a broad and insightful analysis of
what exactly went wrong on a macro level, and offers a task list of changes needed
to stabilize the regulatory framework. At its simplest, the 2008 crisis was caused
by markets and financial services evolving where systems and facilities did not.
Capital markets today are not quite what they were a few decades ago. The market
is now “global in nature”; “characterized by fierce competition” between financial
service providers; “no longer features barriers between … products, sectors and
actors”; features increasing costs of “monitoring conduct and risk”; and “features
large and relatively liquid unregulated institutional financial markets.”4 In line with
what has been said by a host of economists and regulators,5 Tafara suggests that
1.
2.

3.
4.
5.

(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) 391 pages.
Sometimes referred to as the ‘Great Recession.’ See David Wessel, “Did ‘Great Recession’
Live Up to the Name?”, The Wall Street Journal (8 April 2010) online: <http://on.wsj.
com/1ihDKux >. Also referred to as the ‘Lesser Depression.’ See Paul Krugman, “The Lesser
Depression”, The New York Times (21 July 2011) online: <http://nyti.ms/19rImGy >.
Ibid at xi.
Ibid at xi-xxiii.
A vast amount of research and commentary has been published on this topic. See especially,
Viral V Acharya & Matthew Richardson, Restoring Financial Stability: How to Repair a Failed
System (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 2009); Paul Krugman, The Return of Depression
Economics and the Crisis of 2008 (New York: WW Norton, 2009); David Wessel, In Fed We
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these deviations “require an equivalent shift in regulatory approach.”6
The first chapter7 starts out with the premise that imperfections in regulatory
reform are inevitable; it is vital to evaluate the processes used during and after
transformation efforts.8 Eilís Ferran presents a comprehensive overview of EU
post-crisis financial services law reform, but readily admits her focus is “selective.”9
Ferran’s interest lies in the factors contributing to the “post-crisis regulatory
agenda.”10 She considers the “preferences of the key opinion-formers,” and
determines which of those have materialized into law and which have been
“filtered out.”11 Ferran suggests that the “logical end point is a pan-European system
of regulation and supervision with national supervisors reduced mostly to a branch
office role”—with a greater role being played by the European Commission.12
In the second chapter,13 Niamh Moloney considers post-crisis reforms in
the EU “from a regulatory design perspective,” and examines the legacy of those
reforms.14 Moloney suggests that the “key regulatory innovation” has been
addressing financial market intensity and financial market innovation.15 She
describes this effect as significantly expanding the breadth of market regulation.
With respect to consumer protection regulation, the effect has been the introduction
of new “retail market regulatory tools related to product intervention,”16 such as
restricting markets for financial instruments that might raise investor protection
concerns.17 Moloney concludes with the evaluation that these “innovations are
neither wholly good nor wholly bad.”18

6.
7.
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9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Trust: Ben Bernanke’s War on the Great Panic (New York: Crown Business, 2009).
Supra note 1 at xii.
Eilís Ferran, “Crisis-driven regulatory reform: where in the world is the EU going?” in Ferran
et al, supra note 1 at 1.
Ibid at 5-6.
Ibid at 8.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid at 108-09.
Niamh Moloney, “The legacy effects of the financial crisis on regulatory design in the EU?”
in Ferran et al, supra note 1 at 111.
Ibid.
Ibid at 112.
Ibid at 202.
Ibid at 190.
Ibid at 202.
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In chapter three,19 Jennifer Hill sets out to correct the self-laudatory position
of Australian government officials in their assessment of how well Australia fared
during the crisis. Part I explores Australia’s experience of, and response to, the crisis,
while Part II provides an overview of the country’s market regulation. Part III looks
at the role of regulation through the crisis period. Part IV looks at supranational
agreements, and Part V considers recent regulatory reforms. By the end of Part
VI, Hill demonstrates that Australia’s performance was due to its strong pre-crisis
position, as well as a range of contributing economic, legal, and regulatory factors.
In the final chapter,20 John Coffee, Jr. attempts to highlight the oppositional
perspectives of those involved in the debate on regulatory reform. His project
is to demonstrate that the 2008 crisis is “being wasted”21—that history repeats
itself when it is ignored.22 Coffee takes issue with what he calls the “‘Tea Party
Caucus’ of corporate and securities law professors,”23 arguing that their position
is fundamentally unsound. In Part II, he shows how financial reform legislation
is and can be “frustrated” by opponents.24 Part III demonstrates how the 2002
Sarbanes-Oxley Act25 has been diminished “at the implementation stage.”26 Part
IV examines the policy considerations that inspired the 2010 Dodd-Frank Act,27
and Part V considers the implementation of that Act.
Having read through the wealth of material presented by these leading scholars,
readers would be well served to revisit Tafara’s prescient foreword, which insists
on a program of regulatory change “types” needed—and detailed in subsequent
chapters—to make world markets stronger than before. This collection of essays
is cohesive in its argument and masterful in its presentation of details. Light
reading it is not.
19. Jennifer G Hill, “Why did Australia fare so well in the global financial crisis?” in Ferran et al
supra note 1 at 203.
20. John C Coffee, Jr, “The political economy of Dodd-Frank: Why financial reform tends to be
frustrated and systemic risk perpetuated” in Ferran et al, supra note 1 at 301.
21. Supra note 1 at 312.
22. Ibid at 368.
23. The Caucus consists of Roberta Romano, Yale Law School; Stephen Bainbridge, UCLA
Law School; and Larry Ribstein, University of Illinois College of Law. In Coffee’s view,
the Caucus members together believe that: (1) “Congress should not legislate after market
crashes”; (2) “state laws are superior to federal law in regulating corporate governance”;
and (3) “federal securities law should … not attempt substantive regulation of corporate
governance.” Ibid at 306-07.
24. Ibid at 311.
25. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, PL 107-204, 116 Stat 745.
26. Supra note 2 at 311.
27. Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub L No 111- 203, 124 Stat
1376 (2010).

